University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 18
Number 2 Winter, 1988

Article 9

1988

Recent Developments: Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission: Nexus Approach Adopted When
Government Attempts to Restrict Land
Development
Stephanie L. Demchyk

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Demchyk, Stephanie L. (1988) "Recent Developments: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: Nexus Approach Adopted When
Government Attempts to Restrict Land Development," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 18 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol18/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission: NEXUS APPROACH
ADOPTED WHEN GOVERNMENT
ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT LAND
DEVELOPMENT
When a state or local government
imposes a condition on the new development of land, there must be a substantial
nexus between that condition and some
injury to the public interest caused by the
development. This new "nexus" approach
in land-use regulation was recently
announced by the Supreme Court in Nol·

Ian v. California Coastal Commission, __
U.S. _ , 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
The Nollans owned a beachfront lot on
the Pacific Ocean, improved with a small
bungalow. Originally, the Nollans leased
the property with an option to buy. The
option to buy was conditioned on their
tearing down the bungalow and replacing
it. In order to meet this condition, the
Nollans were required to obtain a coastal
permit from the California Coastal Commission. Consequently, they asked the
commission for permission to tear down
the bungalow and replace it with a threebedroom house. The commission granted
the request, but only on the condition that
the Nollans grant a permanent easement
allowing the public to walk across a portion of their beach, which was located
between two public beaches.
The Nollans filed a petition for writ of
administrative mandamus in the Superior
Court of Ventura County asking it to
invalidate the easement condition. They
argued that the condition could not be
imposed unless there was evidence to prove
that their development of the land would
adversely affect public access to the beach.
The court agreed and remanded the case
back to the commission for a hearing.
After the hearing, the commission reaffirmed its initial imposition of the condition, citing various justifications for their
restriction on the development permit.
The commission reasoned that the new
house would block the publics' view of the
ocean, therefore leading to the development of a "wall of residential structures
that would prevent the public psychologically ... from realizing a stretch of
coastline exists that they have every right
to visit." Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44. Furthermore, the commission believed that
the new house would also increase private
use ofthe beach. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
In essence, the commission stated that
these purported visual and psychological
access problems resulting from the construction of the house, along with future
development in the area would result in a
severe restriction of the publics' ability to

traverse to and along the beaches. Id. Consequently, the commission concluded that
they were justified in requiring the Nollans to offset these burdens by providing
public access to the beaches in the form of
an easement across their property.
In response to the commission's decision, the Nollans filed a supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Superior Court of Ventura County. In the
petition, they argued that the imposition
of the easement condition violated the
takings clause of the fifth amendment, as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. The court agreed
with the Nollans, finding that the California Coastal Act of 1976 authorized the
commission to impose public access conditions on development permits only where
the development would adversely affect
public access to the beach. Id. In the
court's view, the record did not provide
sufficient evidence to conclude that
replacement of the bungalow with a house
would directly and adversely affect public
access to the ocean. Ii The commission
appealed and the California Court of
Appeals reversed, finding no statutory or
constitutional issues ~hich would prohibit
the access condition on the Nollans' development permit. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
The Nollans appealed this decision to the
United States Supreme Court, raising only
the taking issue.
The question, therefore, before the
Supreme Court was whether the public
access condition placed on the Nollans'
coastal permit violated the takings clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
announced what was in effect a new doctrine in land-use regulation. When the
state imposes a condition on new development, he said, there must be a substantial
nexus between that condition and some
injury to the public interest caused by the
development. Had the state ordered the
Nollans to grant the easement rights
directly, Scalia explained, this would have
constituted a taking. Id. But conditioning
the Nollans' rebuilding permit on their
granting of an easement would be a lawful
land-use regulation if it substantially furthered governmental purposes that would
justify denial of the permit. Nolan, 107 S.
Ct. at 3146.
Justice Scalia conceded that it was possible to identify harms that might flow from
the Nollans' development ofthe property,
such as blocking the public's view of the
beach. But he could not find a sufficient
relationship between such a harm and the
award of additional public-access rights to
the beach behind the Nollans' house.
Therefore, the commission's imposition of
the easement condition was not a valid

exercise of land-use power, and was in
effect a "taking," since the condition did
not serve public purposes related to the
permit requirement.
Four justices, led by Justice Brennan, dissented. The dissenters noted that the
Court had long held that the state need
only show a rational relationship between
the regulation and a public interest, when
challenging the exercise of police power
under due process or equal protection
clauses. Nolan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151. The
majority's new nexus requirement was not
consistent, in their opinion, with this general understanding. In effect, the majority
was applying a heightened scrutiny in
examining the exercise of the state's police
power under the takings clause. Nolan, 107
S. Ct. at 3152-53. The dissent would have
given much more deference to the legislature by retaining the less stringent "rational relationship" standard.
The dissent was accurate in noting the
novelty of the result in Nollan. But con- /
trary to the dissent's opinion, this nexus
approach is a good one. State and local
government officials will no longer be able
to demand that developers provide various
benefits to the community which are
remotely related to their development
project. Furthermore, the government will
no longer be able to coerce a property
owner into conferring benefits on the general public, when they have done nothing
that would justify singling them out for
such a restriction.
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